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Hypnosis-Should the Courts Snap Out of It?-
A Closer Look at the Critical Issues
I. INTRODUCTION
At 1:00 a.m. on June 29, 1983, Mary Doe had just finished work and was
making her way through the parking lot.' The night was cool, and Mary walked
hurriedly toward her car that was parked under the lot's only mercury light. While she
stood beside her car and fumbled for her keys, Mary heard footsteps quickly
approaching from behind.
She turned and screamed as her attacker grabbed her and forced her to the
pavement. A coworker, upon hearing Mary scream, called for her and started running
towards the scene. The attacker, not knowing what to do, demanded Mary's car keys,
and threatened harm to her if she did not comply. In fear, Mary readily turned over
her keys. The attacker then jumped into the car and sped away. The police arrested a
suspect several hours later as he was driving the stolen car down a city side street.
In recounting her story to the police, Mary was unable to give a description of
her attacker. She had no conscious memory of the incident. The initial shock had
caused her to block the entire event from her mind.
The case was set for trial. The defendant was charged with one count of at-
tempted rape and one count of grand theft. His defense was that a friend, whom he
refused to identify, lent him the car a half-hour before he was arrested by the police.
He claimed to know nothing of the attempted rape or that the car had been stolen.
Because Mary remained unable to identify her assailant, the prosecutor called in a
qualified hypnotist for assistance in refreshing Mary's memory. Prior to hypnosis, the
prosecutor deposed Mary and took her statement concerning the event. The defense
attorney questioned her extensively as well. Under hypnosis, with only the hypnotist
and Mary present, Mary was able to recall the entire episode. She was then able to
give an accurate description of her attacker. The description given was consistent
with the general description given by the coworker who caused the suspect to flee,
and it closely matched that of the defendant's appearance. With the help of Mary's
testimony, the defendant was convicted on both counts.
In the above hypothetical case, the technique of hypnosis was successfully
employed to assist the victim in recalling a previously unrecallable event. Without its
aid, the police could not have constructed a case sufficient to convict the defendant.
Yet, what is this phenomenon called hypnosis? And why and to what extent has it
worked its way into the courtroom? Within the courtroom, what are its problems? If
such problems exist, are they unique to hypnosis? How can these problems most
effectively be overcome?
1. This is a hypothetical case constructed purely for illustrative purposes.
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The purpose of this Comment is to determine when and under what theories
hypnotically induced testimonial evidence should be admissible in a court of law. No
attempt is made to explain fully the intricacies of the hypnotic phenomenon itself,
2
nor to analyze completely all of its potential uses within the legal system.3 The
primary focus of this Comment will be on the use of pretrial hypnosis, in civil or
criminal litigation, 4 to help refresh a potential trial witness' imperfect memory.
The typical scenario in which the issue of pretrial hypnosis arises was illustrated
by the hypothetical case. A witness or victim is, either because of traumatic neurosis
or other pathological reasons, unable to recall a certain event. To overcome this
problem, the witness is placed in a hypnotic state. This hypnotic state enables the
subject to achieve a heightened state of concentration focused on the particular event
in question. Because of this heightened state, the individual is better able to examine
and retain the facts and details of the incident, and becomes a greater asset to the
police and the courts.
Over the past quarter century, a number of courts have permitted the use of
hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory. Some of these courts have held that the
application of hypnosis merely raises a question of credibility to be decided by the
trier of fact. 5 Other courts admit hypnotically induced testimony, but do so on the
condition that the hypnotic technique employed meet certain procedural safeguards,
6
the adequacy of which is to be determined by the judge. Many courts refuse to admit
the hypnotically induced testimony,7 and base this denial of admission on the Frye
rule,8 claiming that hypnosis has not yet met the Frye standards.
The lack of conformity among the different jurisdictions is caused by differing
beliefs concerning the reliability and effectiveness of the hypnotic process. Courts
2. For a closer look at the technique of hypnosis itself, see generally J. BRAMWELL, HYPNOnSM. ITS HISTORY,
PRACTICE AND THEORY (2d ed. 1906); D. CHEEK & L. LECRON, CLINICAL HYPNOTHERAPY (1968); E. HILGARD. THE
EXPERIENCE OF HYPNOSIS (1968); M. KLINE & L. WOLBERG, THE NATURE OF HYPNOSIS: CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL
APPROACHES (1962); G. ULwFf & D. PETERSON, APPLIED HYPNOSIS AND POSITVE SUGGESTION (1975); Pavlov. The
Identity of Inhibition With Sleep and Hypnosis, 17 Sc!. MONTHLY 603 (1923).
3. For example, this Comment will not discuss the use of hypnosis as a truth determinant or the use of hypnosis on a
witness who is in the process of testifying at trial.
4. The majority of cases discussed herein are criminal. The use of hypnosis within the criminal context is a more
difficult situation because of the protective constitutional rights of an accused. This Comment will be applicable to both
criminal and civil cases. The sections that deal exclusively with an accused's rights will obviously not be applicable to
civil cases, although due process rights must still be taken into consideration.
5. See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); Collier v. State. 244
Ga. 553, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979); People v. Smrekar, 68 111. App. 379,385 N.E. 2d 848 (1979); Pearson v. State. -. Ind.
-, 441 N.E.2d 468 (1982); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. 1980); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244
S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo.
1982).
6. See Brown v. State, 426 So.2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981);
State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981), People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831,427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1980); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649
P.2d 845 (1982).
7. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226.
624 P.2d 1274 (1 81); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125
(1982); People v. Quintanar, - Colo. App. -, 659 P.2d 710 (1982); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519,447
N.E.2d 1190 (1983); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764
(Minn. 1980); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97,436
A.2d 170 (1981).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
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that refuse to admit hypnotically induced testimony believe that several unresolved
problems remain with hypnosis, and hold that until these problems are resolved, the
art of hypnosis will remain an impermissible testimonial aid. Courts that admit the
hypnotically induced testimony recognize the difficulties in using hypnosis, but be-
lieve either that these difficulties merely affect credibility, or that they can be over-
come by adherence to procedural safeguards.
This Comment will discuss the different approaches courts have adopted in
dealing with hypnotically induced testimony. 9 The alleged problems with hypnosis
will then be identified and examined, and a comparison of these problems will be
made with the deficiencies found in ordinary eyewitness testimony,' 0 culminating in
a suggested series of formal guidelines to be followed."
II. HYPNOSIS-WHAT IS IT?
Hypnosis has been defined as "an alteration in consciousness and concentration,
in which the subject manifests a heightened degree of suggestibility, while awareness
is maintained," 12 or as a super-concentrated state of mind that may be brought about
by direct or indirect suggestion.' 3 Individuals often associate various falsities and
misconceptions with hypnosis. To overcome these misconceptions, one author and
hypnotist has espoused a negative definition of hypnosis: Hypnosis is "Not a State of
Sleep . . . Not an Unconscious State . . . Not a Physiological Condition . . . Not a
'Control' Condition." 14 But the hypnotist would go no further in affirmatively defin-
ing hypnosis than to state that "[h]ypnosis is a subjective state of mind in which a
person is more prone to accept acceptable suggestion."'15
The art of hypnosis has been practiced since ancient times. 16 Throughout much
of its history, hypnosis was considered a mysterious 17 and unnatural phenomenon,
often associated with various men of evil and ill-repute. is The modem era of hypno-
sis began in the eighteenth century, when Dr. Frantz Anton Mesmer used "animal
magnetism"19 to enchant his patients as a prelude to their treatment. Dr. Mesmer's
9. See infra text accompanying notes 34-125.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 150-70.
I1. See infra part VII.
12. Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Susceptible? 38 Onto ST. L.J.
567, 570 (1977).
13. H. ARONS, HYPNOSIS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 17 (1967) (quoting Dr. S. J. VanPelt, editor of the British
Journal of Medical Hypnotism).
14. Id. at 11-13.
15. Id. at 15.
16. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 313,
317 (1980).
17. Comment, Refreshing The Memore Of A Witness Through Hypnosis, 5 U.C.L.A.-Ats.SKA L. REv. 266, 270
(1976).
18, It was thought that the monk Rasputin used hypnosis to influence the Russian Csarina. Diamond. supra note 16,
at 320 n.26.
19. Spector & Foster, supra note 12, at 567-68:
Dr. Franz Anton Mesmer, convinced that a type of "animal magnetism" emanated from the hands of the
hypnotist like electric current, ensconced groups of patients around a "baquet," a large circular tub of cold
water filled with glass and iron filings, as a prelude to therapy. Iron rods protruding from the tub were touched to
the afflicted parts of the patients' anatomy. As music pervaded the darkened treatment room, Mesmer appeared
in flowing silken robes, and magnetized the tub by a touch of his hand, inducing "convulsive crises" in the
patients.
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methods were eventually condemned, and the use of hypnosis was greatly dis-
credited. Nevertheless, in the early part of the nineteenth century, hypnosis acquired
scientific respectability through its use as a psychological anesthesia in medical
surgery.2 ° By the middle of the century, however, due to the development of ether
and other anesthesias, the need for hypnosis as an anesthesia had diminished. 2 1 The
utility of hypnosis was finally discovered in the late 1800s when Sigmund Freud
applied it to the treatment of the mentally and emotionally disturbed. 22 Since that
time, acceptance of hypnosis as a valid therapeutic method for treating mental disor-
ders grew slowly; finally, in 1958, hypnosis was recognized by the American Medi-
cal Association as an acceptable and valuable medical tool. 23
Hypnosis has become extremely important in a number of areas. Within the field
of medicine, its benefits are scarcely questioned. Hypnosis is used as a relaxant in
calming the nerves of individuals, 24 as an analgesic in reducing or eliminating senses
of pain, 25 as a device in identifying and curing the problems of persons with multiple
personalities,26 as a tool in deciphering and interpreting dreams and hallucinations,2 7
as a means of aiding memory recall and overcoming amnesia,28 and, in general, as a
means of understanding and treating many forms of mental illness.
In addition, hypnosis has become increasingly useful in the area of criminal
investigation, 29 in which hypnosis is typically used to assist authorities in various
investigations by enhancing people's memories. It may be used to help a witness
recall license plate numbers, 30 "names and places, and other details of an event.'' 3 1
Police departments also use hypnosis to solve amnesia cases, which otherwise may
take days or even weeks to decipher. 32
III. THE EXTENT To WHICH HYPNOSIS HAS WORKED
ITS WAY INTO THE COURTROOM
The practical uses of hypnosis within the medical and law enforcement fields are
apparent from the above discussion. Because of its efficacy in these areas, hypnosis
See also Note, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Induced Recollection, 70 Ky. L.J. 187, 189 (1981-82).
20. See Diamond, supra note 16, at 318 n.21.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 319.
23. Council on Mental Health, Medical Use of Hypnosis, 168 J.A.M.A. 186, 187 (1958).
24. E. HILGARD, DIVIDED CONSCIOUSNESS: MULTIPLE CONTROL IN HU.tAN THOUGHT AND ACTION 163 (1977).
25. Id. at 171.
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id. at 87.
28. H. ARONS, supra note 13, at 34-39.
29. The highly publicized use of hypnosis in the Sam Shephard case and the Boston Strangler case has accelerated its
use. L. TAYLOR, EYEwrrNESS IDENTIFICATION 85 (1982).
30. One famous case in which hypnosis was used successfully to identify a license plate number was the Chochilla
kidnapping case. This 1976 case presented a difficult problem for the F.B.I. It involved the hijacking of a school bus filled
with children:
Neither the children nor the bus driver could identify their three abductors, nor could they supply any
information that might lead to their identification. The F.B.I. finally called in a hypnotist, Dr. William Kroger,
to hypnotize the bus driver. While under hypnosis, the bus driver was able to recall all but one digit of the
kidnappers' license plate number. Armed with this information, the three men were soon found, arrested, and
convicted.
Id.
31. H. ARONS, supra note 13, at 27.
32. Id. at 28.
has slowly worked its way into the court system, where it has occasionally been used
in pretrial proceedings to refresh a witness' imperfect memory, or to overcome a
witness' problem of amnesia.3 3
The first American case to address the issue of pretrial hypnosis was People v.
Ebanks.3 4 In Ebanks the accused tried to prove his innocence through the use of
testimony by an expert witness. The expert attempted to testify that prior to trial the
defendant had denied his guilt while under hypnosis. 35 The trial court refused to
admit the testimony, stating simply that "[t]he law of the United States does not
recognize hypnosis.", 36 On appeal the California Supreme Court refrained from de-
bating the issue and summarily agreed with the trial court, stating simply that "the
[trial] court was right.", 37 For many years following the decision in Ebanks, courts
continued to exclude hypnotically induced testimony. The 1962 Ohio Common Pleas
Court decision in State v. Nebb38 was the first case explicitly allowing the admission
of hypnotically induced testimony.
39
A. The Acceptance of Hypnosis by the Courts
Harding v. State4° was the first reported case to sanction the use of pretrial
hypnosis. In Harding the defendant, while riding in a car with the victim and another
couple, pulled out a gun and shot the victim in the chest. He then removed the victim
from the car and abandoned her along the side of a desolate road. Later the defendant
returned to the victim and raped her while she lay unconscious. 4 1 The trial court
found the defendant guilty of assault with intent to rape and assault with intent to
murder.42 The decision was affirmed on appeal.43 Following the shooting, the victim
fell into a state of shock and was unable to recall any subsequent events. Hypnosis
was successfully employed, resulting in the victim's substantial recall of the episode.
The trial court allowed the victim to testify over the defendant's objection. On appeal
33. Generally there are three types of amnesia. Congrade amnesia involves the total loss of recall of the event itself,
retrograde amnesia is amnesia of events preceding the incident in question, and anterograde amnesia is amnesia of the
events following the incident. Spector & Foster, supra note 12, at 572. See generally E. HILGARD, supra note 24, at
62-86.
34. 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
35. Id. at 665, 49 P. at 1053.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. No. 39,540 (C.P. Franklin Co., Ohio, May 28, 1962). State v. Nebb is discussed in Herman, The Use of
Hypno-lnduced Statements in Criminal Cases, 25 OtIO ST. L.J. 1 (1964).
The defendant, Arthur Nebb, believing that his wife, Bernice, was in bed with another man, drove to his wife's home
(they were living apart at the time). Upon arriving at the house, the defendant, with gun in hand, entered the house and
shot and killed an innocent friend of Bernice. He also wounded his wife. Evidence indicated that the two were merely
talking at the time of the shooting. Arthur was charged with first degree murder.
At trial, before the judge and the party attorneys (the jury was temporarily dismissed), Arthur was hypnotized by a
hypnotist. While under hypnosis, Arthur indicated that he never intended to kill the friend, but supposedly mistook her for
the man he thought his wife was in bed with. After the hypnotic session, the prosecution decided to amend the indictment
and proceed on a charge of manslaughter, and to file on information charging Arthur with aggravated assault. Arthur Nebb
pleaded guilty to both offenses. No. 39,540, at 4-8 (C.P. Franklin Co., Ohio, May 28, 1962).
39. Although State v. Nebb involved testimony hypnotically induced while the witness was on the stand, this
Comment does not address the propriety of such tactics.
40. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
41. Id. at 232-35, 246 A.2d at 304-05.
42. Id. at 232, 246 A.2d at 304.
43. Id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312.
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the Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated that the admission of the victim's
testimony concerning the crime was not improper. 44 The court took the position that
even though the witness had testified to events recalled with the aid of hypnosis, this
was not a ground for exclusion; rather, it was merely a credibility factor to be
considered by the trier of fact when evaluating the truthfulness of the witness'
testimony. 45 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated:
On the witness stand she recited the facts and stated that she was doing so from her own
recollection. The fact that she had told different stories or had achieved her present
knowledge after being hypnotized concerns the question of the weight of the evidence
which the trier of facts, in this case the jury, must decide.4 6
Since 1968, other courts 4 7 have reiterated the Harding outcome, holding that the
effect of hypnosis goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. The
Oregon Court of Appeals, in State v. Jorgensen,48 found that even though the witness
had related different stories at previous times, this would not be a basis for disallow-
ing the testimony. 4 9 The jury was to determine the credibility of the witness,50 and
the use of hypnosis was merely a factor that would affect the credibility of the
testimony. 5 1 The Ninth Circuit, in Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corporation,52 reached
the same conclusion, holding that "[h]is [the witness'] credibility and the weight to
be given such testimony were for the jury to determine." 53
In allowing the hypnotically induced testimony into evidence, the theory of
present recollection refreshed is the underlying principle that sanctions hypnosis as a
proper device in refreshing one's memory. This theory is implicit in the reasoning of
the above state court cases, and was noted by the Ninth Circuit in Wyller. 54 The
ability of witnesses at trial to refresh their memories has long been recognized by the
courts in both England and the United States. 55 The established procedure is to
provide the witness with a written document, memorandum, or any other object or
device that will aid the witness' memory while being examined on the stand. If the
witness can testify from memory alone, after having reviewed the memorandum, then
the witness' memory has truly been refreshed. This is termed present recollection
refreshed. 56 Conversely, if upon examining the memorandum the witness is unable to
testify from memory, but instead can only testify by expressing the contents of the
memorandum that has been presented, then the witness is merely relying on the
44. Id. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d
372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Smrekar, 68 I11. App. 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d
423 (Mo. App. 1980); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1, 492
P.2d 312 (1971).
48. 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971).
49. Id. at 9, 492 P.2d at 315.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 509.
54. Id.
55. 3 J. WIMORi, EVIDENCE § 735 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
56. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 9 (2d ed. 1972).
written recital of matters remembered in the past. This is considered past recollection
recorded, and is distinguished from present recollection refreshed.5" The court in
Wyller found the use of hypnosis in refreshing a witness' memory to be a form of
present recollection refreshed. 58 The witness, while on the witness stand, is recollect-
ing from his own memory and is not testifying with the assistance of any outside
writing; therefore the court is correct in stating that the recollection is present
recollection, and not past recollection. The Wyller decision attaches a solid
principle 59 to the use of hypnosis, and provides a reasoned basis for the admissibility
of hypnotically induced testimony.
In 1979, five years after Wyller, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. AVkard,60
went one step further in admitting hypnotically induced evidence. In Awkard the
court elaborated on its earlier decision and stated that "[b]ecause there is no issue
about the admission of hypnotically refreshed evidence, there is no need for a founda-
tion concerning the nature and effects of hypnosis." 6 1 Thus, by alleviating the need
for the laying of a proper foundation prior to admitting hypnotic testimony into
evidence, the court effectively buttressed the case for its admissibility. The Ninth
Circuit appears to be the only court to date that has gone this far (i.e., omitting the
requirement of a foundation) in admitting hypnotic testimony.
In State v. Greer,62 a 1980 case, the Missouri Court of Appeals reviewed the
past history of cases dealing with hypnosis. The court found that the majority63 of
states that have considered the issue have held that hypnotically refreshed testimony
is not, as a matter of law, inadmissible. 64 The court went on to note that "[tihe line of
authority idmitting such evidence reasons that hypnosis aids recall, and later identi-
fications are made from refreshed recollections.' '65 The court concluded that the
authorities hold the effect of hypnosis to be merely an element to be weighed by the
trier of fact.66
B. The Rejection of Hypnosis Within the Pretrial Process
Despite the history of cases admitting hypnotically induced testimony into evi-
dence, a recent trend among the courts today has been either to limit severely the use
57. 3 J. WIO.%IORE, supra note 55, § 738 (Chadboum rev. ed. 1970). Present recollection is generally considered
more accurate than past recollection, and is therefore preferred. Id.
58. 503 F.2d 506. 509 (9th Cir. 1974).
59. The principle of allowing witnesses to refresh their memories from a prior writing is included in the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See FuD. R. EVID. 612.
60. 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
61. Id. at 669.
62. 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. 1980).
63. See Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 379, 385 N.E.2d
848 (1979); Commonwealth v. Juvenile, 381 Mass. 727, 412 N.E.2d 339 (1980); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo.
App. 1980); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831,427 N.Y.S.2d 181
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1,492
P.2d 312 (1971); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
64. 609 S.W.2d 423, 433 (Mo. App. 1980).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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of hypnosis, 67 or to deny the admissibility of it in toto.68 In State v. Mack69 the
Supreme Court of Minnesota chose the latter approach. The court expressed concern
over the potential problems with the use of hypnosis, and ruled that information
elicited through pretrial hypnosis is inadmissible in criminal proceedings. 70
1. The Applicability of the Frye Rule
The Mack court held that the art of hypnosis, as understood today, has yet to
meet the standards set forth in Frye v. United States.7 1 Until the Mack decision, no
court had explicitly applied the Frye rule in considering the admissibility of testimony
induced through hypnosis. The issue in Frye was the admissibility of the results of a
"deception test" (an early form of what is known today as the polygraph test)72 into
evidence. In discussing the deception test, the court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that "the thing [the scientific principle in question] from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs."- 73 Consequently, under the Frye rule,
mechanical or scientific testing results are inadmissible unless the testing technique
has evolved to the point at which experts in the field largely share the view that the
results are scientifically reliable as accurate. 74
In applying the Frye doctrine to hypnosis, the Mack court stated:
[a]lthough hypnotically-adduced "memory" is not strictly analogous to the results of
mechanical testing, we are persuaded that the Frye rule is equally applicable in this
context, where the best expert testimony indicates that no expert can determine whether
memory retrieved by hypnosis, or any part of that memory, is truth, falsehood, or con-
fabulation .... Such results are not scientifically reliable as accurate. 75
The effect of the Mack decision is a determination that hypnosis has not yet reached
the plateau of general acceptance within the medical community as a reliable device
in accurately refreshing one's memory.
67. See Commonwealth v. Juvenile, 381 Mass. 727, 412 N.E.2d 339 (1980); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525,432 A.2d
86 (1981); People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); State v. Glebock, 616
S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
68. See State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 1St
Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982); People v. Gonzales, 108 Mich. App. 145, 310 N.W.2d 306 (1981);
State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981).
69. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
70. Id. at 771.
71. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
72. The polygraph, or "lie detector" ... is basically a machine that is hooked up to the subject in such a way
that his respiration rate, perspiration (through detection of skin conductivity), blood pressure andfor pulse is
recorded as he answers questions posed by the examiner. The theory is that a suspect's or witness' awareness
that he is lying, combined with concern over being caught in a lie, create emotional disturbances which are
transformed into physiological changes which can be detected by the machine.
L. TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 71 (1982).
73. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
74. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn. 1980).
75. Id. at768. "Confabulation" is defined as "the filling in of memory gaps with false memories or inaccurate bits
of information." Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony. 4 OHro N.U.L. REv. 1, 5 (1977).
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2. Differing Interpretations of Frye v. United States
In some jurisdictions7 6 the Frye rule is held inapplicable to the use of pretrial
hypnosis. One view is to interpret Frye as pertaining only to mechanical testing
devices,77 therefore making it inapplicable to hypnosis. The scientific evidence in
question in Frye concerned the validity of the results of a polygraph test. The Frye
rule was eventually extended to other mechanical devices as well. For example, it has
been applied to such physical tests as radar78 and voiceprints. 9 Frye, however, is not
applied consistently to all scientific evidence. Rather, if and how the courts will apply
it to any given situation is unclear.80
Thus, one can support the position that Frye is limited to mechanical testing
devices. Nevertheless, the courts have not generally adhered to that view. 81 Instead,
courts tend to conclude either implicitly or explicitly that "[like the results of a
polygraph examination or voiceprint analysis, the credibility of recall stimulated by
hypnosis depends upon the reliability of the scientific procedure used." 82 The result
of applying the Frye rule to hypnosis in this way is to hinge the admissibility of
hypnotically induced testimony on the acceptance of hypnosis itself, regardless of
whether expert testimony is required to interpret or explain the hypnosis.
Yet another reading of Frye would be to apply the rule only to expert testimony
concerning the scientific method.83 Under this approach, Frye would be inapplicable
76. The majority of courts that have admitted hypnotic testimony have not applied the Frye rule. See United States v.
Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d. 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); People v. Smrekar, 68 11. App. 379, 385 N.E. 2d 848 (1979); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. 1980);
State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978); State v. Jorgenson, 8 Or. App. 1,492 P.2d 312 (1971). But see
State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981); State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (1981) (courts apply Frye
rule to hypnosis, yet hold hypnosis admissible in certain instances).
77. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981), where the court recognized this view without
adopting it. See also Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REv. 313 (1964),
miner. The theory is that a suspect's or witness' awareness that he is lying, combined with concern over being caught in a
lie, create emotional disturbances which are transformed into physiological changes which can be detected by the
machine.
L. TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 71 (1982).
79. See Commonwealth v. Lykes, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975); State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d
384 (1967).
80. See Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80
CoLuss. L. REv. 1197, 1221, 1228 (1980) ("Instead of using Frye as an analytical tool to decide whether novel scientific
evidence should be admitted, it appears that many courts apply it as a label to justify their own views about reliability of
particular forensic techniques.")
81. See United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979) (court applies Frye
equivalent to expert testimony concerning the microscopic comparison of hair samples); State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368
(Mo. 1972) (Frye applies to the results of a blood examination by neutron activation analysis); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio
St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (court applies the Frye rule to exclude expert testimony on the "battered women's
syndrome").
82. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981). See also Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519,
447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983).
83. See Brown v. State, 426 So.2d 76, 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983):
[W]e conclude that the method by which testimony is hypnotically induced is not one that falls within the ambit
ofFrye. "'[T]echnically the test is not directly applicable because it is concerned with the admissibility of expert
opinion deduced from the results of a scientific technique, such as a lie detector test. and not with the
admissibility of eyewitness testimony."
(citing Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REv. 1203, 1217 (1981)) (emphasis in
original).
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to hypnosis unless expert testimony was first required as a foundation to admissibil-
ity. Yet, as noted previously, the Ninth Circuit has held that for hypnotically induced
testimony "there is no need for a foundation concerning the nature and effects of
hypnosis." 84 Consequently, this reading of Frye, if conjoined with the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning, would result in the inapplicability of the Frye rule to hypnosis.
Most courts that nonetheless have applied the Frye rule to hypnosis have held
that Frye precludes the admissibility of hypnosis, without even considering that
expert testimony may not be required. Instead, they have applied Frye to hypnosis in
a generalized manner. The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Mena85 followed the
lead of the Mack court and adhered to the Frye rule in determining the admissibility
of hypnosis in general. The court stated that: "until hypnosis gains general accept-
ance in the field of medicine and psychiatry as a method by which memories are
accurately improved ... we feel that testimony of witnesses which has been tainted
by hypnosis should be excluded in criminal cases."
8 6
Later in the same year in which State v. Mena was decided, the Maryland Court
of Appeals, in Polk v. State,87 reviewed its earlier landmark decision in Harding v.
State88 and held the Frye rule applicable to pretrial hypnosis, just as the Mena and
Mack courts had done. The court meticulously pointed out that the Frye rule is not
only applicable to the hypnotic technique itself, but that it also encompasses the
testimony adduced from it. The witness' testimony was determined to be the end
product of the administered hypnosis and could not be disassociated from it.
89
Though Polk relied on the Frye doctrine, the case did not explicitly overrule
Harding; instead, the case was remanded for a determination of whether hypnotically
induced testimony had met the Frye test. Yet, in 1982, in Collins v. State,90 the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals did explicitly overrule Harding, holding that the
Frye standard is applicable to hypnotically induced testimony and that hypnosis has
not met that standard since it is not accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific
community. 9
1
Cases like Collins and Polk indicate a trend that could result in the complete
demise of Harding and its progeny. Hypnotically induced testimony could continue
to be held inadmissible until "hypnosis [is] generally acceptable in the relevant
84. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 885 (1979). See supra text
accompanying notes 60-61.
85. 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981).
86. Id. at 231, 624 P.2d at 1279. The effect of the Mena decision is to hold any witness who has undergone hypnosis
incompetent to testify. This complete bar of testimony of the witness was modified, however, by a subsequent Arizona
case, State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982), in which the court held:
[A] witness will not be rendered incompetent merely because he or she was hypnotized during the investigatory
phase of the case. That witness will be permitted to testify with regard to those matters which he or she was able
to recall and relate prior to hypnosis.... [But this is] assuming that such matters were remembered and related
to the authorities prior to use of hypnosis.
Id. at 209, 644 P.2d at 1295 (emphasis in original).
87. 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
89. 48 Md. App. 382, 394, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048 (1981).
90. 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982).
91. Id. at 205, 447 A.2d at 1283.
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scientific community for the purpose of memory retrieval. "92 Yet, not all courts have
applied the Frye doctrine in the same broad manner as the above courts.
9 3
In State v. Hurd,94 the New Jersey Supreme Court found that even though the
Frye rule is applicable to hypnosis, Frye does not preclude admission of hypnotically
induced evidence. The Hurd court held that it is not "a precondition of admissibility,
that hypnosis be generally accepted as a means of reviving truthful or historically
accurate recall." 95 The purpose of hypnosis is not to obtain the truth, in the manner
of a polygraph; rather, hypnosis is employed simply to overcome a witness memory
problem, and it is considered reasonably reliable as long as it yields recollection that
is as accurate as that of an ordinary witness. 96 The court proceeded to find that
medical research has sufficiently established that hypnotic subjects "have the ability
to concentrate on a past event and volunteer previously unrevealed statements con-
ceming the event." 9 7 Consequently, "[i]n this limited sense, hypnosis has met the
test imposed by Frye."
98
In analyzing the Frye rule and the purpose behind its application to hypnosis, the
approach of the Hurd court to the issue is the most logical. The primary purpose for
using hypnosis is to elicit previously inaccessible factual evidence from the witness.
The function of hypnosis, in reaching this evidence, is to place the witnesses in a
superior state of concentration 99 which will enable them to better remember the
questioned events. Since it is accepted that hypnosis can properly alter a person's
ability to concentrate on past events,'10 it is reliable in this strict sense, and therefore
has adequately met the Frye standard.
C. A New Approach to Admissibility
After finding that hypnotically induced testimony meets the standards of the
Frye test, the Hurd court addressed another hurdle concerning its admissibility. The
court recognized that when hypnosis results in ap out-of-court or in-court identifica-
92. Id. at 202, 447 A.2d at 1281.
93. At least one court has noted an alternative to the Frye rule, to be applied to hypnosis. The Florida District Court
of Appeals in Brown v. State, 426 So.2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), held that the test to be used in admitting
hypnotically induced testimony is the relevancy test. So long as evidence is proven to be both logically and legally
relevant, it is admissible under the relevancy test. If evidence is found to be logically relevant, the issue of legal relevance
is then addressed. Logically relevant evidence is defined as "evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact." FLA.
STAT. § 90.401 (1979). Evidence is legally relevant if its probative value is not "substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence ....
FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1979). Within the legal relevancy prong of the relevancy test, the reliability of the technique in
question is an important factor to consider. The reliability of the evidence is directly related to the probative value of the
scientific evidence. If the technique is not reliable, the evidence derived from it is unreliable, and therefore it is not legally
relevant. Brown v. State, 426 So.2d 76, 87-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct, App. 1983). The relevancy approach thus differs from the
Free rule in that it does not automatically exclude evidence that is not generally considered reliable by the scientific
community. Yet, it is similar to Frye in that the "novelty and want of general acceptance are integral parts of the
relevancy analysis which may lessen the probative value of a scientific test on technique." Id. at 89 (citing Gianelli, supra
note 80) (emphasis in original).
94. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
95, Id. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92.
96. Id. at 537-38, 432 A.2d at 92.
97. Id. (quoting from the lower court decision, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 361, 414 A.2d 291, 305 (1980)).
98. Id.
99. See supra text accompanying note 13.
100. See Spector & Foster, supra note 12, at 570.
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tion of the defendant, certain fifth amendment due process requirements must be
met.' ' An identification following a pretrial identification procedure must not be so
unnecessarily suggestive as to cause irreparable mistaken identification, which in turn
amounts to a violation of due process. 10 2 The reliability of the evidence is the
"linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. "103 The Hurd
court concluded that if the hypnotically induced testimony satisfies certain require-
ments, it would also meet the Supreme Court's due process standards for
identification. 10 4 These safeguards were held necessary to ensure a minimum level of
reliability, as well as to provide an adequate record for evaluating the reliability of the
hypnotic procedure:' 0 5 The hypnotist should be a licensed psychiatrist or psycholo-
gist, professionally trained in the techniques of hypnosis; 10 6 the professional should
be independent of either party in the litigation; 0 7 all information given to the hypno-
tist by the enforcement authorities must be in writing to determine the extent of the
information given to the subject by the hypnotist; '0 8 prior to the hypnotic session, the
hypnotist should acquire from the subject a detailed factual description as remem-
bered by the subject to avoid adding new data to the witness' description of the
events;' 0 9 all contact between the hypnotist and the subject should be recorded to
provide an available record for study that can later be used to determine whether the
subject's past hypnotic memory has been tainted by outside information or
suggestion; 110 and only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during all
phases of the hypnotic session."'
The Hurd court indicated that if these procedures are met and no suggestive or
coercive acts were used to influence the witness, then the hypnotically refreshed
testimony should be admitted. 112 The court went on to hold that the determination of
admissibility must be made in a hearing outside the presence of the jury' 3 and that
the defendant has the initial burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the hypnotic session was overly suggestive. 114 If the defendant succeeds, the
101. 86 N.J. 525, 547, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981).
102. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). See also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972):
[T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the
witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,
and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
103. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
104. 86 N.J. 525, 548, 432 A.2d 86, 98 (1981).
105. Id.
106. A hypnotist with these credentials "will be able to conduct the interrogation in a manner most likely to yield
accurate recall." Id. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 96.
109. Id.
110. If possible the session should be videotaped. Id.
111. The purpose of this requirement is to avoid undesired influence or suggestion caused by another's presence. Id.
112. Id.
113. The Wyoming Supreme Court, in discussing the Hurd requirements, recognized them as valid concerns, but
held that they bear only on the credibility of the witness, and not on the witness' competency. "Any one or all of the six
points [the Hurd requirements] may, or may not, have bearing on the credibility of such witness in a given use. But to
make the six points a foundation requirement to the competency of the witness is improper and unworkable." Chapman v.
State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Wyo. 1982).
114. 86 N.J. 525, 546, 432 A.2d 86, 96 (1981).
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burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
hypnotically induced evidence is reliable under the totality of the circumstances." 
5
The Hurd case demonstrates the approach of one court in allowing the use of
pretrial hypnosis. The court adopted numerous intricate guidelines to follow as con-
ditions precedent to admissibility, the purposes of which are to exploit the potential
usefulness of hypnosis while simultaneously accounting for its deficiencies.
Although the Hurd requirements constitute a valid method of ensuring the reliability
of the hypnotic evidence, more detail as to the number and content of the require-
ments may be necessary, as will be explained below.1'6
D. A Case for Inadmissibility
In the 1982 decision of People v. Shirley, 117 the California Supreme Court
rejected the admissibility of hypnotically induced testimony in all cases.' 8 Yet, the
specific facts of the case weighed heavily against the admission of the testimony into
evidence. In Shirley, a rape victim claimed that the defendant illegally entered her
apartment while she lay asleep on her living room couch. The victim awoke to find
the defendant standing naked in front of her, holding a butcher knife. The defendant
proceeded to force the victim to move to her bedroom and disrobe. He then allegedly
raped her." 9 The victim was intoxicated at the time of the rape,120 and, as a result,
her memory was blurred as to what had transpired. Since she could not properly
perceive the events as they occurred, she was unable to correctly record those events
in her memory.
121
Shirley thus differed from a typical shock amnesia case in which the witness is
able to perceive the occurrence of events and to record these perceptions accurately,
but then forgets what was perceived and recorded. 122 Consequently, in Shirley, it is
doubtful that the victim had an accurate memory that could have been properly
refreshed by hypnosis, 123 and the probable effect of hypnosis would have been
merely to reinforce an inaccurate account of the events.
Another factor that discredited the validity of the hypnosis in Shirley was the
lack of qualifications of the hypnotist.124 The hypnotist was neither a psychiatrist nor
a physician, and he purported to have only minimal training in administering hypno-
sis. Also, the subject in the case carried high expectations of what could be achieved
with hypnosis, believing strongly that the hypnosis would allow her to "remember
more than normal."'5 These factors reduced the reliability of the information that
115. Id.
116. See infra part VII.
117. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 458 U.S 1125 (1982).
118. Id. at 66-67, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
119. Id. at 24-25, 641 P.2d at 777, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 74, 641 P.2d at 809, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
122. Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness
Identification, 29 STAN. L. REv. 969, 977 (1977).
123. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 74, 641 P.2d 775, 809, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 278 (1982) (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
124. Id. at 75, 641 P.2d at 810, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 278 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
125. Id. at 30, 641 P.2d at 781, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
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was obtained from the hypnosis and provided an adequate basis for the court to
disallow its use in the case at hand. Yet, because of these factors, the Shirley case
itself was an inappropriate case in which to judge the utility of hypnosis. Therefore, it
was not an adequate vehicle for the California Supreme Court to use in adopting a per
se exclusionary rule for all hypnotically induced testimony.
IV. WITHIN THE COURTROOM: THE PROBLEMS WITH HYPNOSIS
The Shirley court, in rejecting the use of hypnotically induced testimony, drafted
an extensive and well-written opinion explaining the numerous problems that arise
from using hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory. The following discussion presents
the major problems with hypnosis identified by the Shirley court and those that are
often cited to forbid as unreliable the use of hypnosis in the pretrial process.
A. Suggestiveness
The foremost problem with hypnosis is its alleged unreliability in accurately
refreshing one's memory. 126 As indicated by the Shirley court, hypnosis is consid-
ered unreliable primarily because of its ability to make an individual extremely
susceptible to suggestion,' 27 a condition termed "hypersuggestiveness."' 28 Indeed,
hypnosis has been described as a state of increased suggestibility.129 This extreme
state of suggestibility may cause individuals to lose or forego their own sense of
critical judgment. 130 As a result, subjects may incorporate into their memories some
cues from the hypnotist's questions or comments made during the session, or from
the hypnotist's manner or conduct.' 3'
B. Desire to Please
Similarly, subjects may acquire inaccurate memories by consciously attempting
to produce positive results in the hypnotic session if they have a compelling desire to
please the hypnotist or some other person present at the time of the session. 132 This is
termed "hypercompliance."' 33 The subjects may wish to supply answers that they
feel are expected of them. Thus, when individuals lack a clear memory and con-
sequently are uncertain of how to respond to questions, they may confabulate 34 or
126. Id. at 34, 641 P.2d at 781, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 251. See also Diamond, supra note 16, at 332; Spector & Foster,
supra note 12, at 589.
127. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 64, 641 P.2d 775, 802, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 271 (1982) (citing M. OPjE, ON THE SUiU.ATING
SUBJECT AS A QUASI CONTROL GROUP IN HYPNOSIS RESEARCH: WHAT, WHY, AND How, IN HYPNOSIS: RESEARCH
DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 400-03 (Fromm & Schor edits. 1972); Diamond, supra note 16, at 333; Orne, The
Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 322-327 (1979); Owe, The
Nature of Hypnosis: Artifact and Essence, 58 J. ABNORM. & SOC. PSYCH. 277, 280-86, 297 (1959)).
128. Brown v. State, 426 So.2d 76, 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (hypersuggestiveness is defined as "a mental state
in which a subject surrenders a great degree of will power and independent judgment to the hypnotist.") (citing Comment,
Hypnosis-Its Role and Current Admissibility in the Criminal Law, 17 \vIL.AIETTE L. Rev. 665, 671-73 (1981)).
129. Diamond, supra note 16, at 333.
130. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 539, 432 A.2d 86, 93 (1981).
131. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 64, 641 P.2d 775, 802, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 271, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125
(1982).
132. Id. at 64, 641 P.2d at 803, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
133. Brown v. State, 426 So.2d 76, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
134. See supra note 75.
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fantasize their answers.' 35 The subjects are said to have "manufactured" their
statements. 136 For example, the subject in Shirley was sure that hypnosis would help
her remember more than was otherwise possible. This belief may have caused the
victim, while under hypnosis, to confabulate inaccurate statements and to give fabri-
cated answers as part of her story, even though she was not certain of what truly
happened.
The court in State v. Mena137 addressed this problem by noting that in order for
witnesses to testify strictly from their own recollections, they must recollect only
from their prior observations, and not from any ill-conceived impressions implanted
in their memories. 38 As the court indicated, many authorities are of the opinion that
"a witness will recall memories fabricated under hypnosis as his own recollection
and will be unable to distinguish his true memories from pseudomemories implanted
during hypnosis."' 139 Thus, because of a hypnotized individual's heightened
suggestibility or compelling desire to please, false or unreliable recollection by the
subject may result.
C. Unrecognizable "Pseudomemory"
Once subjects have incorporated confabulated material into their memory, they
have created a "pseudomemory,"' 40 which cannot be distinguished from a true
memory. 14' Subsequently, "when the subject repeats that recall [the pseudomemory]
in the waking state (e.g., in a trial), neither an expert nor a lay observer (e.g., the
judge or jury) can make a similar distinction." 42 After the hypnotic session, the
witnesses are said to remember the content of their new memories, but to have
forgotten the source; this is why such a witness is unable to distinguish between real
and fabricated recollections.
D. "Unshakeable" Testimony
Once pseudomemory has contaminated a subject's memory, not only is it in-
distinguishable from true memory, but the witness also acquires excessive confidence
in its accuracy. The Shirley court stated that the witness "will become convinced that
the story he told under hypnosis is true and correct in every respect." 14 3 Such an
effect on the witness' story is sometimes enhanced by a posthypnotic suggestion for
the witness to remember everything upon awakening, or simply by the witness' own
belief that hypnosis will help in remembering the entire event clearly, 144 as in
135. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 64, 641 P.2d 775, 803, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,272, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125
(1982).
136. Id. at 73, 641 P.2d at 808, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 277 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
137. 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981).
138. Id. at 230, 624 P.2d at 1278 (1981) (citing 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 133 (1974); Diamond, supra note 16;
Dilloff, supra note 75).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 65,641 P.2d 775, 803, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,272, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125
(1982).
142. Id.
143. Id. See also Diamond, supra note 16, at 339.
144. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 65,641 P.2d 775, 803, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,272, cert. denied,458 U.S. 1125
(1982).
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Shirley.'45 The problem with this increased confidence is that it tends to make the
witness appear "unshakeable" while on the witness stand.146 As the Shirley court
noted, "the witness's [sic] conviction of the absolute truth ... grows stronger each
time he is asked to repeat the story; ... the resulting 'memory' may be so fixed in
his mind that traditional legal techniques such as cross examination may be largely
ineffective to expose its unreliability." 147 Similarly, the Mena court noted that the
effect of cross-examination may be lost after an individual has undergone hypnosis:
"[H]e [the witness] will often be more convinced of the accuracy of such hypnoti-
cally induced memories than those recalled due to the witness' actual
observations.' ' 148 Jurors may be misled in judging the demeanor of a hypnotized
witness and in turn may give more credence to the witness' testimony than they
would have had hypnosis not been administered. 149
V. ARE THESE PROBLEMS UNIQUE To HYPNOSIS?
Although the reliability of hypnotically induced testimony is sometimes dis-
puted, when used properly hypnosis can be a beneficial and productive instrument
that assists the fact-finder, and, "[a]s such, it may, under proper analysis, provide a
useful method for obtaining otherwise inaccessible information for the fact-finder,
which like any testimony is subject to inherent problems of memory and per-
ception." ' 150 Moreover, as was also mentioned above, many of the same reliability
problems present with hypnotically induced testimony have also been found to be
present with ordinary eyewitness testimony.
The problems with ordinary testimony typically result from imperfections in-
herent in memory recall. Studies have shown that memory is not a mere reproduction
of perceived events.' 5 ' Rather, inaccurate details not representative of the events in
question are often incorporated into witnesses' memories. Confabulation is the result.
Witnesses fill in the gaps in their memories by unconsciously confabulating to make
the total picture of the event conform to their expectations of what must have
occurred. 152 For example, when a witness' description of an event or suspect grows
145. See supra text accompanying note 125.
146. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. 1980).
147. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 65-66, 641 P.2d 775, 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 272 (1982).
148. 128 Ariz. 226, 230, 624 P.2d 1274, 1278 (1981).
149. It may be asserted that because of its adverse impact on the efficacy of cross examination, pretrial hypnosis
raises sixth amendment confrontation clause problems. But, as is explained in the subsequent text, so long as proper
procedures are followed, hypnosis renders cross examination no more ineffective than does normal eyewitness testimony.
Hence, the use at trial of hypnotically induced testimony raises no significant confrontation clause problems. For a closer
look at the confrontation clause in general, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See also Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules and Due
Process-A Proposal for Determining when Hearsay May be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REv. 529 (1974);
Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional
Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1378 (1972); Graham, The Confrontation Clause, The Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful
Witness, 56 TEx. L. REV. 151 (1979); Westen, The Future of Confrontation, 77 MiCH. L. REv. 1185 (1979).
150. Spector & Foster, supra note 12, at 613.
151. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 541, 432 A.2d 86, 94 (1981). See generally Baggett, Memory for Explicit and
Implicit Information in Picture Stories, 14 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAVIOR 538 (1975); Buckhout. Eyewitness
Testimony, Sci. AM., Dec. 1974, at 23; Note, supra note 122, at 983.
152. Note, supra note 122, at 983.
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more detailed as time goes by, the witness has probably altered the recollection to
include extra details acquired from mug shots, newspaper reports, or police in-
vestigations. 153
Other problems also arise with nonhypnotic eyewitness testimony. Often a wit-
ness' perceptions of an event are greatly altered by the questioning and interrogation
that follow. The witness feels obligated to remember every detail concerning the
incident in question. The interrogator may directly or indirectly pressure the witness
into giving some type of response, regardless of whether the witness is sure of what
really happened. 154 Interrogators may also use leading or suggestive questions that
tend to impose their views of the incident on the witness. Such distortion may occur
when the interrogators have a certain suspect in mind, or their own theories about the
case, although it is not limited to such instances. 155 The overt suggestion and views
of the interrogator become a permanent part of the witness' recollection of the event:
"These suggestions transmitted during the interrogation process have been found to
affect not only the witness' immediate answer, but also his subsequent recollection of
the event.' 15
6
A witness also may be influenced through undue suggestion in other ways. The
use of photographs, showings,' 57 or lineups to identify the defendant may result in
providing the subtle clues that influence the witness in the selection process. 158
Moreover, the witness' desire to please and to avoid looking foolish may affect the
outcome of a lineup by exerting pressure to identify a suspect, even though the true
culprit is not present. 159
As a result of the above described influences, an innocent defendant conceivably
could be prosecuted and wrongly convicted of a crime. 160 The problems resulting
from suggestion were recognized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade,
16
'
in which the Court stated that "[tIhe influence of improper suggestion upon identify-
ing witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single
factor-perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all other factors com-
bined."1 62 The facts of the well-known case of Sacco and Vanzetti are illustrative of
the profound effect that improper suggestion and confabulation have on nonhypnotic
witnesses. 1
63
In that controversial case, two men were seen leaning against a residential fence,
153. Id.
154. Id. at 984.
155. E. LoFwt-s, EwmrrNss TESTIMONY 76 (1979).
156. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 542, 432 A.2d 86, 94 (1981) (citing Note, supra note 122, at 984).
157. A showing is a one-to-one confrontation between the eyewitness and the suspect, in which the witness is
permitted to view the suspect by himself. The showing is considered to be the most suggestive of identification
procedures. L. TAYLOR, supra note 29, at 101 (1982).
158. See generally N. SOBEL, EYEWITNEss IDENTIFICATION (1982). See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (suspect has a constitutional right to have counsel present at a pretrial lineup).
159. Note, supra note 122, at 988.
160. For an example of how innocent men have been falsely convicted through misidentification see E. BORCHARD,
CONVICTING THE INNOcENT (1932).
161. 338 U.S. 218 (1967).
162. Id. at 229 (quoting from P. WALL, EYEw-rrNess IDETIMFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965)).
163. The synopsis of the now infamous case of Sacco and Vanzetti is paraphrased from the account in L. TAYLOR,
supra note 29, at XIII-XV (1982).
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watching while a cashier and his bodyguard walked by with bags containing over
$15,000. One of the leaning men suddenly jumped forward, pulled a gun and shot the
bodyguard and cashier. A car pulled up next to the bodies, and the two men jumped
in and were quickly driven away.
Some time later, police arrested Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. Wit-
nesses to the shooting were repeatedly shown photographs of the suspects and
brought in to identify the two men while they were being held in jail.
At the subsequent trial, four witnesses positively identified Vanzetti. Yet, not
one of them had been able to identify him originally; only after repeatedly being
shown photographs of Vanzetti were they finally able to confirm his role in the
murders.
The case against Sacco was similar. Five eyewitnesses positively identified the
Italian shoemaker at trial. Yet, one had earlier admitted that he had not seen enough
to identify either of the killers. Another advised police that she had not been able to
see the faces of either of the two men at the time of the incident. A third had
previously told three different persons that he could not make an identification. A
fourth had testified at the preliminary hearing that she had not seen enough at the time
of the crime to identify Sacco.
At the trial, one of the witnesses positively identified Sacco as the man in the
back seat of the getaway car and gave the following detailed description:
"[He was] slightly taller than I am. He weighed possibly from 140 to 145 pounds. He was
muscular-he was an active man. I noticed particularly the left hand was a good sized
hand, a hand that denoted strength .... He had a gray, what I thought was a shirt
... the face was what we could call clear-cut, clean-cut face. Through here was a little
narrow, just a little narrow. The forehead was high. The hair was brushed back and it was
between, I should think, two inches and two and one-half inches in length, and had dark
eyebrows, by the complexion was a white, a peculiar white that looked greenish."' 64
The witness made her observations based on having seen the killers in the car for
only two or three seconds as it sped away. She was sixty to eighty feet from the car.
On the basis of such testimony, and despite seemingly solid alibis,' 65 Sacco and
Vanzetti were convicted of murder and eventually electrocuted.
The Sacco and Vanzetti case illustrates, in a shocking way, how suggestion (the
repeated showing of the photographs)166 and confabulation 67 (the details with which
the witnesses identified Sacco) can completely distort witnesses' memories, and
hence their testimony. Also, as was exemplified by the infamous case, it is very
difficult to disclose these distortions through cross-examination or otherwise, since
164. Id. at XIV.
165. A merchant testified that Vanzetti was buying cloth from him in Plymouth at the time of the shootings, and a
clerk from the Italian consulate in Boston clearly recalled Sacco applying for a passport on that day. Id.
166. In commenting on the Sacco and Vanzetti case and in particular on how the witnesses moved from uncertainty
to complete certainty, one author commented: "Legal scholars who analyzed the identification techniques claimed that
numerous improper methods produced this result. Other reports indicated that not a single person could originally identify
Vanzetti, but that the repeated showing of his photographs to various witnesses finally produced identifications from a
number of them." See E. Lo'rus, supra note 155, at 2.
167. See supra note 75. See also Buckhout, supra note 151, at 25, in which the author, in a discussion of the
witness' description of Sacco, stated that "[t]he description must have been a fabrication."
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by the date of trial the witnesses had repeated their stories so many times' 68 that they
had acquired false confidence in their recollections, a confidence that increased with
time and with every retelling. Such confidence is a false confidence since research
has shown that the degree of confidence witnesses have in their memories does not
accurately correlate with the accuracy of the recollection in question; on the contrary,
the reverse is sometimes true.' 69 Such overconfidence carries with it a potential for
causing juries to lend excessive credence to the testimony, either because the witness
appears confident on the stand, or because the witness is unshakeable on cross-
examination.
The difficulties identified with hypnosis are thus the same problems that are
inherent in normal eyewitness recall. Yet, when the admissibility of hypnotically
induced testimony is discussed, these problems tend to be amplified and associated
exclusively with the hypnotic process itself. Although it is true that because it causes
a heightened state of suggestibility, hypnosis may marginally aggravate the problems
entangled with ordinary testimony, this fact alone is not sufficient to warrant its
exclusion. So long as testimony induced by hypnosis "is comparable in accuracy to
normal human memory,"' 7 ° it should be held admissible in a court of law.
VI. OVERCOMING THE PROBLEMS WITH HYPNOSIS
In order to guarantee that hypnotically induced testimony is "comparable in
accuracy to normal human memory," courts should strictly adhere to the following
set of guidelines.
A. A Qualified Hypnotist
Initially, to ensure that the hypnosis is properly administered, a licensed psychi-
atrist or psychologist who is trained in the use of hypnosis should carry out the
treatment. The reasons for this are obvious. The hypnotist must fully understand the
technique and the procedures required to carefully refresh the subject's memory
without causing damage to the subject's recall or the subject's general mental con-
dition. 7 ' The hypnotist should also be studiously impartial, to avoid unconsciously
coloring the subject's recall in a particular direction. To improve impartiality, the
courts should adopt a system by which only court-appointed hypnotists 7 ' are used to
conduct the hypnosis. This system not only would ensure unbiased results, but would
also guarantee that an appointed hypnotist has the appropriate credentials to perform
the treatment. The court, in turn, would not have to waste the time and resources to
determine, each time hypnosis was used, whether or not the hypnotist was properly
168. See infra note 196.
169. Note. supra note 122, at 985.
170. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 543, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (1981).
171, For a look at the mental problems that can result from improperly administering hypnosis, see W. BRYAN,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNosis, 9-33 (1962).
172. See Note, Hypnosis in Court: A Memory Aid for Witnesses, I GA. L. REv. 268, 287 (1967). The use of a
court-appointed hypnotist will also induce the court to keep records on hypnotic cases in order to determine, through
empirical evidence, the efficacy of hypnosis in the courtroom. Id. at 287-88.
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qualified, since this already would have been determined. The cost of the system
could be borne by the parties requesting the hypnosis. 173
B. Strict Procedures To Follow
Once the hypnotist becomes involved in the case, an initial determination must
be made concerning the effectiveness of hypnotic treatment in the case at hand. The
hypnotist must determine whether hypnosis is an appropriate device in helping re-
fresh the witness' memory. The reason for the subject's memory loss and the nature
of the memory loss are important factors to consider in evaluating the reliability of
hypnosis in restoring recall. 174 Hypnosis is most reliable when there is a traumatic
neurosis, or some other pathological reason for the memory deficiency, 175 although it
is not necessarily limited to such problems. 176
If a determination is made that hypnosis would be effective in a particular case, a
series of procedural safeguards should nevertheless be followed to preserve the
accuracy of the witness' recollections. Many of these safeguards were expressed by
Dr. Martin Orne, 17 7 whose influence was in large part responsible for the specific set
of requirements adopted by the court in State v. Hurd. '7 8 First, only the hypnotist and
the subject should be present during the session. 179 This prevents the possibility of
other persons (e.g., the attorney who requested hypnosis) influencing the subject
while under hypnosis. 180
Second, in questioning the subject, the psychiatrist or psychologist should avoid
using leading or suggestive questions or conduct. The purpose of this is, similarly, to
avoid corrupting the subject's memory with suggestion. 18 1 Preventing suggestion
from affecting a subject's memory is a delicate matter; hypnosis is, by definition, a
state of suggestibility.182 The hypnotist therefore must adopt a particularly passive
technique. Prior to the hypnosis, the hypnotist should avoid any unneeded com-
munication with people involved in the case, since this could influence the hypno-
tist's opinion.1 83 Preferably, only a written memorandum outlining the facts of the
173. Exceptions can be made, of course, for indigent parties.
174. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 544, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (1981) (citing Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in
Court, 27 INT'L. J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311, 325 (1979)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 544 n.4, 432 A.2d at 95 n.4.
177. Dr. Martin Ome, a well-known psychiatrist and psychologist, is the Editor of the International Journal of
Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis and is director of the Institute for Experimental Psychiatry at the University of
Pennsylvania. He is "one of the foremost experts on the subject of hypnosis." Brown v. State, 426 So.2d 76, 89 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
178. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 94-115.
179. 86 N.J. 525, 546, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981).
180. It is important to note that the attorneys involved in the action should be permitted to view the session through a
two-way mirror.
181. A subject under hypnosis is extremely susceptible to suggestion. See supra note 128 and text accompanying
notes 127-31.
182. See Diamond, supra note 16, at 333.
183. For example, verbal communication with the attorneys or investigators involved in the case should be avoided.
See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 546, 432 A.2d 86, 96 (1981) (court notes that the extent of the information given to the
hypnotist will help determine the amount of suggestion the hypnotist may have communicated to the subject).
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case should be given to the hypnotist.' 84 Finally, prior to the session, the hypnotist
should interview the witness to acquire an accurate account of the facts as remem-
bered by the witness, for it is important to record the witness' prehypnotic account of
the incident.' 8
5
Because of hypercompliance' 86 and subjects' tendencies to believe that hypnosis
will help them remember more than normal, witnesses may fantasize or confabulate
memories.' 87 To help avoid this problem, hypnotists should, in the prehypnosis
interviews, explain to witnesses that hypnosis is not productive in all cases with all
subjects and that it may not always result in adequate refreshment of an individual's
memory.'18 An adequate explanation should remove from witnesses' mind the strong
belief that hypnosis will make them remember more than normal. Similarly, caution-
ing subjects to respond only to questions they can adequately answer and to refrain
from giving answers merely to avoid appearing ignorant will be profitable. Such a
warning, along with a further warning to refrain from being overly responsive, should
be sufficient to negate a subject's loyal desire to please.
The problem of subjects becoming overly confident in their convictions concern-
ing the incidents in question is sometimes caused by a hypnotist's imposition of a
posthypnotic suggestion upon witnesses to recall all that was said while they were
under hypnosis.'8 9 For example, in People v. Davis'90 a policeman-hypnotist di-
rected his subject in the following manner: "What you'll find at the end of [the
hypnotic session], you'll have practically a photographic recall of everything I ask
you and everything you answer .. , "191 Such a statement may cause a witness'
recall to appear exact and detailed, when it is actually vague and uncertain.' 92 Thus,
posthypnotic suggestions should not be employed when hypnotizing a subject in
preparation for trial testimony.
Even without posthypnotic suggestions, witnesses' personal expectations con-
cerning the effect of hypnosis may cause them to be excessively confident in their
hypnotically induced recollections. 93 As noted previously, 194 this matter can be
resolved by the hypnotist's explaining the limitations of the technique. A witness is to
be informed concerning the practical effects of the hypnosis and its true ability to help
the subject accurately remember.
The court in People v. Shirley noted a further cause of the overconfidence
184. Note, The Use of Hypnosis to Refresh Memory: Invaluable Tool or Dangerous Device? 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
1059, 1074-75 (1982).
185. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983) (admission of prehypnotic
testimonial evidence is dependent on a careful record of the witness' prehypnotic memory).
186. See supra text accompanying note 133.
187. See supra note 75.
188. The subject may not be susceptible to hypnosis, Spector & Foster, supra note 12, at 569, or the particular case
may not be one which is appropriate for hypnosis. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 544, 543 A.2d 86, 95 (1981).
189. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 65, 641 P.2d 775, 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,272, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125
(1982).
190. No. 52,660 (Super. Ct. Placier Co., Cal., July 30, 1979).
191. Id. See Diamond, supra note 16, at 340.
192. Spector & Foster, supra note 12, at 593; Diamond, supra note 16, at 340.
193. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 65, 641 P.2d 775, 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243,272, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125
(1982).
194. See supra text accompanying note 188.
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problem. The court feared that before witnesses testify at trial, they have repeated
their stories so frequently that their testimony has become staunchly fixed in their
minds, and it would render cross-examination ineffective. 195 Yet, this problem is not
unique to hypnosis. In most cases witnesses repeat their stories numerous times prior
to trial. 196 Hence, regardless of whether hypnosis is employed, the result is the
same-the witness retains strong convictions of the facts surrounding the events in
question.
C. Coping with a Perplexed Jury
One final problem in using hypnosis is that once the jury becomes aware that the
witness has undergone hypnosis, a stigmatizing effect on the jury may result. 97 The
jury may be unduly impressed or mystified by the very use of hypnosis. At this point
the court should admit expert testimony to explain the scientific technique of hypno-
sis and to inform the jury of the extent to which hypnosis can affect an individual's
testimony. The jurors will then better understand hypnosis and will comprehend how
hypnosis can help or harm a person's recollection, and will be in a position to
evaluate objectively the credibility of the testimony before them.
Perhaps a more efficient way of dealing with a mystified jury is to refrain from
communicating to them that hypnosis was used. If the court and the adverse party to
the action are satisfied that all the safeguards were properly followed and that no
injury to the witness' recollection occurred, then there is no need to inform the jury of
the use of hypnosis. In this situation, as in most others, the prevention is more
effective than the cure. The court's time will be saved, and a battle of the experts,
which in the end may tend only to confuse the jury, will be prevented.
This approach omits the requirement of laying a proper foundation before the
hypnotically induced testimony can be admitted and is consistent with the approach
adopted by the Ninth Circuit:' 98 "[U]nless an adverse party attacks the witness's [sic]
ability to recall by bringing out or exploring the fact of hypnosis, the use of expert
testimony to support the efficacy of hypnosis is improper." 1 99 Thus, to comply with
this approach, not only is it unnecessary for the party who called the witness to lay a
foundation for the testimony, but it is impermissible to do so unless the opposing
party first raises the issue."'
D. Pretrial Hearings
To determine whether the above safeguards have been adhered to adequately, a
pretrial hearing on the matter should be held. 20 ' In this hearing, if the court finds that
195. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 65-66, 641 P.2d 775, 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 272 (1982).
196. A typical scenario can be described as follows: Following the event in question, a witness tells her story to the
police, describes it to her family and friends, explains it to the lawyer of the proponent party in the case, relays it to the
opposing attorney in the form of a deposition, rehearses it several times prior to trial with the proponent's lawyer, and then
finally testifies at trial.
197. See Levitt, The Use of Hypnosis to "'Freshen" the Memory of Witnesses or Victims, 17 TRIAL 56, 58 (April
1981).
198. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885 (1979).
199. Id. at 670.
200. Id.
201. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 543, 432 A.2d 86, 95 (1981).
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all the required procedures have been followed, and the witness' testimony is suf-
ficiently untainted, the court should admit the testimony into evidence. To facilitate
the judge's determination, hypnotic sessions should be videotaped.2 °z A videotape of
the hypnosis allows the judge to view the hypnotic therapy directly in deciding
whether or not the necessary procedures were properly followed. In addition it gives
the attorneys in the action another opportunity to review the session. 20 3 Also, before
the court reviews the videotape of the hypnosis, the parties can properly introduce
expert opinion on the validity of the hypnotically induced testimony. 2 ' This expert
testimony will educate the judge on the hidden problems in using hypnosis and will
facilitate the determination as to whether the technique used was proper.
E. The Preservation Deposition
After considering each party's evidence on the matter and examining the
videotape, the court may find that the hypnotically induced testimony is too suspect
to be of probative value. 20 5 In such a case, or, similarly, in those states that do not
admit hypnotically induced testimony, a court may take one of three positions to
determine the fate of the witness' testimony. One is that the witness may be permitted
to testify, but only about matters that are wholly unrelated to the matters questioned
in hypnosis.20 6 Alternatively, the witness may be precluded from testifying as to any
matter at all.20 7 The third choice is to allow the witness to testify, but only as to
knowledge the witness possessed prior to hypnosis.20 8 In either of the first two
situations, the party requesting the hypnosis is likely to lose all of the relevant
evidence otherwise obtainable from the witness. To avoid this loss of testimonial
evidence, a preservation deposition should be taken before the witness undergoes
hypnosis. This deposition will preserve the witness' testimony and should be admis-
sible at trial in the event that the witness is precluded from testifying because of the
202. Id. at 546, 432 A.2d at 97. But see Diamond, supra note 16, at 339. The victim's knowledge of the use of
videotape is itself a distorting factor, since it will tend to alter his attitude and behavior.
203. The attorneys in the case should have at least one opportunity to view the tape, in order to raise any objections
they may have at the pretrial hearing.
204. The expert testimony should be given to the judge before the videotape is shown, so that the judge will know
what procedure is proper.
205. According to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
206. The courts that permit a witness to testify only concerning prehypnotic knowledge also implicitly permit the
witness to testify about matters wholly unrelated to the hypnosis. This, however, remains a separate alternative for the
courts, i.e., a court may refuse to admit any evidence that was related to the hypnosis, even though it can be shown
that the witness had knowledge of the same evidence prior to hypnosis, but the court may still allow the witness to testify
to matters unrelated to those dealt with under hypnosis.
207. See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982).
See also Dilloff, supra note 75, at 21. Under this alternative the witness is, in effect, considered incompetent to testify.
208. See State ex rel Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982); People v. Quintanar,
Colo. App. -, 659 P.2d 710 (1982); Pearson v. State, - Ind. -, 441 N.E.2d 468 (1982); Commonwealth v.
Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); People v. Wallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 312 N.W.2d 387 (1981); State
v. Koehler, 312 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1981); People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17,452 N.Y.S.2d 929 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982);
People v. Smith, 117 Misc. 2d 737, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 528 (N.Y. App. Term 1983); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 294 Pa.
Super. 171, 439 A.2d 805 (1982).
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imprecision of the hypnosis. 20 9 Obviously, the adverse party must have the opportu-
nity to cross-examine the witness at the deposition.2z l
In the third situation, the witness can testify to matters known prior to hypnosis,
but only if a careful record of the witness' prehypnotic memory is preserved. 21 ' A
recording of the prehypnotic memory of the event in written, tape-recorded or
videotaped form will suffice. 212 The purpose of this third category is to allow the
police the benefit of hypnosis as an investigatory tool without losing the benefit of the
witness' prehypnotic testimony at trial.2z 3 In all three situations, the effect of the
deposition would be to allow the witness to testify about matters recalled prior to
hypnosis, either in person (situation three) or through the deposition (situations one
and two).
The above procedural safeguards are necessary to protect the accuracy and the
reliability of a witness' testimony. These requirements must be complied with strin-
gently to guarantee admission of the testimony into evidence. 2 14 If the party attempt-
ing to introduce the hypnotically induced testimony establishes by clear and convinc-
ing evidence the reliability of the testimony, the evidence should be admitted. A strict
standard of clear and convincing evidence is desirable as a further safeguard to
guarantee the reliability of the evidence. Once the evidence is admitted, the opponent
of the hypnosis should be permitted to challenge the reliability of the testimony at
trial, but not the reliability of hypnosis in general.21 5
In attacking the reliability of the testimony, the adverse party may or may not, as
the circumstances warrant, disclose that hypnosis was administered in refreshing the
witness' memory. If the use of hypnosis is disclosed, both parties may submit evi-
dence as to the appropriateness of applying hypnosis in the case at hand, and as to the
hypnotist's adherence to proper procedures of hypnosis.216
If a party attempts to impeach a witness by using a prehypnotic deposition or
other prehypnotic statements (e.g., statements to the police) to show that the witness
was not able to remember certain events or had given answers inconsistent with his
in-court testimony, the proponent party, under the theory of rehabilitation, should
then be permitted to rehabilitate the witness by disclosing that hypnosis had been
administered to the witness after these prior statements. After it becomes known that
hypnosis was used, expert testimony should then be admitted to explain the concept
and its applicability in the instant case. Again, the door has now been opened.
209. The preservation deposition would be an exception to the Hearsay Rule (FeD. R. EVID. 802) by virtue of Rule
804(b)(1), under which "a deposition taken in compliance with law" is former testimony, which is not subject to the
hearsay rule. The witness would be incompetent to testify, and should therefore meet the 804 requirement of
unavailability; as Rule 804(a) states: "'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant... (4) is
unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of mental illness or infirmity. " FED. R. EviD. 804(a)(4) (emphasis
added).
210. Note, supra note 184, at 1085 n. 169.
211. Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, -, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1197 (1983).
212. People v. Quintanar, - Colo. App. -, 659 P.2d 710, 713 (1982).
213. Id.
214. This stringent burden of proof is justified because of the potential abuse which can arise when hypnosis is not
properly utilized. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 546-47, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981).
215. Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 171-213.
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Allowing the proponent of the hypnosis to divulge that hypnosis was employed will
prevent the adversary from unfairly impeaching the witness with prior inconsistent
statements when the jury has not also been informed that hypnosis had been adminis-
tered.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although hypnosis has been generally accepted in the medical community and in
the field of criminal justice, it has yet to achieve similar acceptance within the court
system. Many courts have permitted its employment to help potential trial witnesses
refresh their imperfect conscious memories, while other courts have rejected this
application because of the claimed problems inherent in the process. Some of the
courts and commentators that have addressed the issue of hypnosis have assumed that
the difficulties involved are substantially unique to the hypnotic process. Yet, as
revealed above,2 17 the problems with hypnotically induced testimony are not unique
to the use of hypnosis, but are common to eyewitness testimony in general.
Obviously, courts are not prepared to exclude all ordinary eyewitness testimony
simply because of the inaccuracies that may result; to do so may leave the courts
"little choice but to return to trial by combat or ordeal." '2 18 The new issue involves a
balancing of interests: Are the potential risks that arise in using ordinary testimony
outweighed by its apparent benefits? The answer is an obvious "yes," for eyewitness
testimony today represents a major cornerstone in our trial process. Still, it is admit-
ted that ordinary testimony is not without its drawbacks. To deal with these problems,
ordinary testimony has not been wholly excluded; instead, numerous exceptions to
the rules of admission have been developed.
Similarly, it must be conceded that hypnosis is not without its faults. When used
inappropriately, or administered improperly, hypnosis can easily contaminate a wit-
ness' memory. But just as rules are followed to circumvent the problems with
nonhypnotic testimony, similar rules can be complied with to minimize the difficul-
ties inherent in hypnotic testimony. Some courts and legislators 2 19 have already
adopted necessary procedures designed to guarantee the reliability of hypnosis and
simultaneously to avoid its deficiencies.
In sum, the following procedural rules should be observed when using hypnosis
to refresh a witness' recollection:
217. See supra text accompanying notes 150-72.
218. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 76, 641 P.2d 775, 810, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 279 (Kaus, J., concurring and
dissenting), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982).
219. The State of Oregon has enacted a series of statutes governing the admissibility of hypnotic testimony. See OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 136.675-136.695 (1979). The statutes are too barren in their standards to be considered complete, in that
the only procedural safeguard expressly required is a recording of the hypnotic procedure. OR. REv. STAT. § 136.675 is
entitled "Conditions for use of testimony of persons subjected to hypnosis," and reads as follows:
If either prosecution or defense in any criminal proceeding in the State of Oregon intends to offer the testimony
of any person, including the defendant, who has been subjected to hypnosis, mesmerism or any other form of
the exertion of will power or the power of suggestion which is intended to or results in a state of trance, sleep or
entire or partial unconsciousness relating to the subject matter of the proposed testimony, performed by any
person, it shall be a condition of the use of such testimony that the entire procedure be recorded either on
videotape or any mechanical recording device. The unabridged videotape or mechanical recording shall be made
available to the other party or parties in accordance with ORS 135.805 to 135.990.
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(1) The hypnosis should be administered only by a court-appointed, licensed
psychiatrist or psychologist, who is professionally trained in the use of
hypnosis.
(2) A preservation deposition should be taken prior to the hypnosis.
(3) A court-appointed hypnotist must determine whether hypnosis is an appro-
priate method of refreshing the witness' memory given the facts and the
circumstances of the case before the court.
(4) Any information given to the hypnotist prior to the hypnotic session must be
in written or recordable form.
(5) Videotape or some other mechanical taping device must be employed to
maintain a complete record of the hypnotic procedure. A complete record
includes all substantive contact between the hypnotist and the witness.
(6) The hypnotist should conduct a prehypnotic interview with the subject to
obtain a detailed description of the facts as the subject recalls them. Also,
during this interview, the hypnotist should caution the subject regarding
false expectations concerning the success of the treatment, and should warn
the subject not to be overly responsive in an attempt to please or look good.
(7) Only the hypnotist and the subject are to be present during the session. The
hypnotist should not use any suggestive or leading questions. The hypnotist
should impose no posthypnotic suggestions on the subject.
If all of these procedures have been properly followed (a pretrial hearing should
be held to decide this issue) and it is determined that the testimony adduced from
hypnosis is convincingly reliable, then the hypnotic testimony should be admitted
into evidence before the court.
To secure the "promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence," 2 2 ° the courts must utilize every reasonable means available to present the
fact-finder with as much probative evidence as possible. Hypnosis represents one
method of obtaining evidence that is normally unobtainable. It places the fact-finder
in a more comfortable position when deciding the ultimate issues of the case. Hence,
when appropriate, it should be employed to assure that the trier of fact is given every
opportunity to arrive at the most correct and just result attainable.
Richard G. Montevideo
220. This is found in Rule 102, Purpose and Construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EVID. 102.
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